The commonly accepted story about the U.S. welfare state is that it developed between the 1930s and the late 1960s and then suffered a series of policy and political setbacks during the 1970s, which triggered a political backlash. Conservative politicians from Richard Nixon to Ronald Reagan successfully harnessed white middle-class anger over government programs in order to roll back the welfare state. At first glance, the fate of federal programs that subsidize apartments for low-income tenants confirms this narrative: the federal government created housing programs during the New Deal; it added to them significantly during the 1960s. In the late 1960s and 1970s, bad press, conservative attacks, and policy mistakes triggered cutbacks in the 1980s.
. 3 To be sure, these units were not targeted to tenants who were as poor as those in projects built during the Great Society, but to the working poor-tenants who earned less than 50 or 60 percent of their area's median income. Even so, this program managed to serve tenants who were poorer than the statutes required. A 1997 General Accounting Office (GAO) report that surveyed projects built with funding from the 1986 Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program, one of the new programs for subsidizing low-income housing, found that three-quarters of the households earned less than 50 percent of their area's median income. 4 This article will trace the history of how the federal government began to use decentralized funding tools to finance local networks of nonprofits and private businesses to build housing for low-income tenants. This transformation took place over three distinct periods: (1) the rise and fall of federal bureaucracies, 1964-80, (2) federal cutbacks 1980-86, and (3) the decentralized funding era, 1986-96. The article ends in 1996, when the decentralized funding programs overwhelmed critics on Capitol Hill and established the policy era we are still in, where decentralized federal funds (block grants and tax credits) fund a network of for-profit and nonprofit affordable home builders. This shift in approach had its strengths and weaknesses; it also had significant consequences for understanding the evolution of the American welfare state. One of the most enigmatic changes was that the welfare state became less transparent, lost in a confusion of public-private partnerships and back-door financing techniques.
The History of Federal Housing Programs
Despite the lofty rhetoric of housing programs like the Housing Act of 1949, which promised "a decent home for every American," the federal government never financed many low-income units. In fact, in some years, it destroyed more units than it built. Before the creation of the Department of Housing and Urban Development in 1965, the peak annual production of affordable housing through the public housing program was 71,000 units in 1951. 5 During the Great Society the numbers skyrocketed for a four-year period (see the chart below). 6 Richard Nixon imposed a moratorium on new construction in 1973. HUD had one more burst of building during the Carter administration, but since then the number of units built has remained low.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, three funding programs began to subsidize housing in new, and often indirect, ways. The chart above shows the number of units financed by one of the new housing finance programs, the 1986 Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC). While the LIHTC program churned out smaller numbers of units than the peak HUD production years, it did so at a rate that was higher than the historic average and it has held steady for more than fifteen years. By 2000, nearly 115,000 apartments were being financed by LIHTC annually. 7 These units were also of higher quality, which meant that they were likely to last longer than the hastily built units of the late 1960s and early 1970s. To say that since the Reagan administration the federal government was out of the affordable housing business is simply wrong.
During the 1980s two simultaneous policy revolutions took place (or perhaps a revolution and a counter-revolution). On the national level, Reagan's Revolution dramatically cut back the role of the federal government in housing; the revolution from above eliminated funds. At the local level, a revolution from below was taking shape, as community groups, local and state governments, and elements of the private sector pulled together to find ways to build housing for low-income tenants without federal help. In 1988 housing advocate Paul Grogan testified before Congress that "the brute force of the federal cutbacks in housing in the last seven or eight years, while doing undeniable harm to many, have produced an unprecedented response in the housing arena at the state and local levels and have activated a staggering array of new involvements on the part of state and local government, the nonprofit sector, the private sector, labor unions, churches, and the list goes on." 8 The local effort started small but demonstrated how a decentralized housing network might work. In time, the network grew in sophistication, became politically active, and lobbied successfully for more federal resources. The most important new funding programs were the 450,000 500,000 1 9 6 1 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 7 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 7 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 Year
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Community Development Block Grant (1974) , LIHTC (1986) , and HOME funds from the National Affordable Housing Act in 1990 (see the chart below). The housing network, made stronger with federal funds, is the prototype for the decentralized welfare state.
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Federal Housing Programs and the Welfare State
The historical scholarship on the welfare state maintains that this institution shrunk in the face of deft attack and weak defense. 10 The standard story seems partly correct. But what happened to the welfare state since the 1970s is more complicated. In subsidized housing programs, both liberals and conservatives were frustrated with the programs of the Great Society, and while they disagreed on emphasis, both looked to change the delivery of social services. Some aspects of the welfare state have been weakened since the 1970s, but others innovated and grew. At the same time that the New York Times was describing affordable housing as a political issue that had "evaporated" and that the Washington Post was reporting that "HUD is about as popular as smallpox," billions of new federal dollars were flowing into new subsidized housing programs. 11 Liberals like House Ways and Means Chairman Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.) joined with conservatives to increase block grants and tax expenditures for affordable housing at the same time they were cutting HUD's budget. Even more interesting, increased funding to subsidized housing through programs such as tax credits were enormously popular. These political debates lacked the sharp edge of prior eras and appeared, at least, to demonstrate a "willingness to walk away from ideology," in the words of Jack Kemp, George H. W. Bush's HUD secretary.
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The paradox in affordable housing illustrates many of the changes with the welfare state. The most dramatic change from the 1970s was not scaled-back funding-although that was true for key programs for the very poor-but a shift in how the federal government delivered welfare state services and who was served. 13 The federal government used an array of policy tools (tax policy, regulation, loans and loan guarantees) to induce nongovernment players (nonprofit corporations and for-profit firms) to participate in shaping new programs that delivered social services. Lester Salamon, Steven Rathgeb Smith, Michael Lipsky, Jacob Hacker, Christopher Howard, Julian Zelizer, and Jennifer Klein have shown that when these other funding mechanisms are taken into account, the welfare state is larger and more comprehensive than one would conclude by simply looking at the bureaucracy-led and direct expenditure-funded programs.
14 Government-sponsored incentives for social services were used with increasing frequency in the 1980s and 1990s and challenge the conception of a withering welfare state.
What is missing from the recent scholarship is an explanation of how the "new tools of government" created new mechanisms to implement policy. This study attempts to fill that gap by tracing how a new type of decentralized network has developed to supply low-income housing. The web of players in this network demonstrated the effectiveness of network organization that the sociologist Walter Powell described: "In network modes of resource allocation, transactions occur neither through the discrete exchanges (markets) nor by administrative fiat (firms), but through networks of individuals engaged in reciprocal, preferential, mutually supportive actions." 15 The network built homes efficiently by working in a "mutually supportive" manner. It also worked effectively to promote itself politically in a way that was similar to the policy communities described by Julian Zelizer in Taxing America. 16 The most dramatic example of the networks success was securing billions in new federal funding during the 1980s. The linking of federal resources to a new network of service providers in subnational government and civil society has created a model for the decentralized welfare state.
Three Eras in Housing Policy
This article will examine how the new housing network developed by focusing on three eras of housing policy history. Three seminal reports by influential government committees on housing and urban problems set the tone and programs for these three periods. 17 The Force (1988) , chaired by David Maxwell and Jim Rouse, was in some ways a synthesis of the previous two. The Maxwell/Rouse Report argued for the federal government to get back into the subsidized housing business but in a different mode, as the coordinator and partial funder of a new network of service providers. These reports framed the subsequent legislative battles over housing policy.
In addition to government reports and legislative history, this article examines the viewpoints of practitioners and policymakers drawing upon interviews, industry journals, speeches, and statements in the media.
18 It focuses on the legislative debates over new decentralized funding programs and concludes with an evaluation of the consequences of this shift in housing policy, and the larger phenomenon of the decentralized welfare state. Section I of this article outlines the three eras of policy history. Section II analyzes the battles for increased funding for the policies promoted in the Maxwell/Rouse report. Section III evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the decentralized housing network.
Section I: Housing and the Great Society
Perhaps the most striking feature of the 1968 Kaiser report was the confidence in government capabilities that pervaded nearly every page. President Lyndon Johnson charged the committee to "find a way to harness the productive power of America-which has proved it can master space and create unmatched abundance in the market place-to the most pressing unfulfilled need of our society. That need is to provide the basic necessities of a decent home and healthy surroundings for every American family now imprisoned in the squalor of the slums." 19 The committee concluded that in the next ten years, the country would have to build 26 million new housing units, six million of which needed to be subsidized for low-income tenants. "Attainment of this goal should eliminate the blight of substandard housing from the face of the nation's cities and should provide every American family with an affordable, decent home." 20 Production of 600,000 units of subsidized housing in each year of this period would have been quite an achievement, since the peak new production year up to this point was barely a tenth as much-71,000 units in 1951. 21 More than confidence, the report reflected a sense of obligation. Housing was considered a matter of economic right, as well as an important national investment in the future. The report stated: "We strongly believe that the goal is necessary and justified for these reasons: [1] Decent housing is essential in helping lower-income families help themselves achieve self fulfillment in a free and democratic society [and 2] Public expenditures for decent housing for the nation's poor, like public expenditures for education and job training, are not so much expenditures as they are essential investments in the future of American society."
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To fulfill this obligation, the report suggested that the federal government join "private enterprise, organized labor, and state and local governments in creative and affirmative partnerships." 23 The report was unequivocal about the fact, however, that the federal government would be the leader and coordinator of the effort to eradicate slums. The report warned that if the new partnerships failed to materialize, the federal government would have to become the "houser of last resort," using its resources, organizational capacity, and legal tools-for example, eminent domain-to build the millions of necessary housing units. "Unquestionably, a direct Federal program of land acquisition, public construction, and public ownership and management of subsidized housing would produce the millions of dwellings needed by low-income families within any determined timespan."
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This housing policy call-to-arms reflected the larger problems of LBJ's War on Poverty. Confidence, commitment, and aggressive goalsetting alone were not sufficient to solve social problems. The report stated that "within urban slums, there are the knotty sociological relations between rundown housing, human behavior, environmental conditions of total neighborhoods, and the disadvantaged life of the poor." 25 The bulk of the report wrestled with the logistics of ramping up an investment in housing that could reach as high as five percent of GDP.
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Linking housing to the "knotty" problems of slums made sense then. It makes sense today. But framing the problem in this way meant that a policy success required a triple win against the material, social, and economic conditions of urban poverty.
The report assumed that the 1970s would continue to experience the economic growth and relatively low inflation of the 1960s. 27 When those conditions failed to materialize, it became increasingly difficult to sell the idea of a massive new government investment in housing for the urban poor.
Another weakness of the Kaiser plan was that the partners in local government and the private sector never quite materialized. It is one thing to invite everyone to a party, but quite another for them to show up. In the 1960s, the federal government invited participation from other levels of government, the private and nonprofit sectors, but they were not ready. Subnational government and community-based groups distrusted each other and lacked the expertise to implement new programs. But the early efforts to develop this capacity paid off in later years. It created an expectation that locals would play a larger role in the decentralized welfare state and started embryonic organizations and programs that grew more capable over time. In 1969, for example, no state had a housing finance agency. By 1990, 48 states did. And in 1969, there were 112 nonprofit community development corporations (CDCs) that built affordable housing. By 1990, more than 1,760 did.
Political scientist Theodore Lowi considers Richard Nixon to be the last Democratic president of the twentieth century. 28 Given the subsidized housing production numbers of his HUD appointee, George Romney, one might agree. The only period when significant numbers of housing units were built was between 1969 and Nixon's 1973 moratorium. In 1970, HUD came as close as it ever did to the Kaiser report's 600,000 per year goal, with 431,000 new subsidized homes that year. 29 Numbers failed to solve the problems of distressed urban areas. New units were being built in center cities as many nearby homes were abandoned. Not only were homes built in the wrong places, but higher productivity created bureaucratic inefficiency at best and outright corruption at worst. Bad design and shoddy construction left a physical legacy of many high-rise apartment buildings that suffered from exploding maintenance costs. Many began to agree with Oscar Newman, who in his influential book, Defensible Space (1973), argued that apartment towers were inherently unsafe because they promoted anonymity, lacked adequate supervision, and encouraged criminal behavior. 30 A shift in property management approach exacerbated the design and construction problems. Less oversight and more desperate tenants fueled the perception-inside and outside public housing-that governmentsubsidized projects had become hopeless holding pens. "Once scrupulously careful about admitting tenants," writes Roger Biles, "local housing authorities became less discriminating and relaxed screening procedures." 31 The problems were real, but the public perception of them was much worse. Most public housing, in fact, was managed well and not of the high-rise design, as Rachel Bratt shows in "Public Housing: The Controversy and Contribution." 32 But the problems in troubled projects were so severe and high-profile that they cast the entire program in a negative light.
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One effort at improvement involved the federal government partnering with the private sector to build housing with programs like 236(d)(3), which provided federal insurance for mortgages, and the Section 8 New Construction program. The most important innovation, however, was CDBG. This new funding program consolidated multiple narrowly targeted funding programs from the Great Society and provided federal funds in unrestricted block grants to local government.
Block grants and "federalism" are associated with Nixon and conservative politics, but liberals who were disillusioned by earlier urbanrenewal programs and perceived HUD inefficiencies were eager to move in this direction as well. David Garrison worked on the CDBG legislation in the early years as legislative counsel to the Office of Federal Relations for the National League of Cities and the U.S. Conference of Mayors and later as a budget analyst for the House Committee on the Budget. Garrison said that efficiency and building capacity at the local level was a concern across the political spectrum. It "was hard to argue then that you get a better result if you had a HUD bureaucrat in some regional office hundreds of miles away making that decision instead." 34 Both Republicans and Democrats saw block grants as an improvement. Garrison said that "there was broad agreement to the basic idea" and the "concept of a block grant was not seen then as a device to do away with the program [CDBG] long term. No one suggested that at all-ever." 35 During the legislative debates over CDBG, liberals and housing advocates, including HUD's first secretary, Robert Weaver, explained that the spirit of the 1968 Housing Act had faded and new ideas and new approaches like block grants were needed. 36 Mayors and a string of local government officials testified for a change in federal programs, including New York City Mayor John Lindsay. Lindsay said the existing programs had made cities pursue actions that "violated common sense." By way of example, he explained that New York was forced to demolish existing buildings to provide space for 70,000 urban-renewal apartments, but there was no construction money to finish the project. Meanwhile, rents were soaring because of a lack of housing supply and "we were forced to relocate families from homes where they could have continued to live." 37 Many other mayors testified to similar challenges for large and small towns all across the country. A statement adopted by the International City Management Association preferred block grants to the prior federal production programs.
With the civil rights struggles so fresh in the national consciousness, it is somewhat surprising to see how enthusiastic civil rights groups were about new federal programs that devolved authority to local governments. James Harvey, representing the Leadership Conference on Civil Rightsa coalition of 132 national civil rights, labor, religious, and civic organizations-lobbied for block grants: "We support the concept of block grants," he said in his congressional testimony. 38 The director for national housing programs for the Urban League, Glenn Claytor, agreed with the opinions of the Leadership Council on Civil Rights, urging "in the strongest possible terms [that Congress] act on the proposed legislation on a priority basis."
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Ronald Reagan's Approach to Subsidized Housing
The Report of the President's Commission on Housing (1982), chaired by William F. McKenna, criticized the Kaiser Committee's approach to housing policy as one that contributed "to deterioration rather than renewal." 40 McKenna's report, rather than putting its faith in government, based its optimism "on an entirely different belief: that the genius of the market economy, freed of the distortions forced by government housing policies and regulations that swung erratically from loving to hostile, can provide for housing far better than Federal programs." The fundamental conclusion to this report was that the market was the answer to the housing problem-a problem created by naive government meddling. "The 1970s taught not only the limits of the good that can be done by government action, but also the depths of the harm that can be wrought by ill-thought or ill-coordinated government policy." 41 From the vantage of the early twenty-first century, this faith in market forces also seems naive. The McKenna report proposed that an entirely deregulated Savings and Loan industry "empowered to solve its own problems without legal handcuffs and regulatory restrictions will generate more money for housing than could be hoped for from institutions seeking to recapture a past that is gone forever." 42 In addition to giving private industry a free hand, the report recommended reducing federal oversight of housing authorities and making federal park land available to low-income housing developers. Years later, the unregulated Savings and Loan industry required a federal bailout that was conservatively estimated to cost $325 billion by the GAO in addition to other incalculable losses to depositors. 43 The McKenna report stated that the "Commission seeks to create a housing sector that functions in an open environment with minimal government participation." 44 It opposed new federally subsidized construction and vowed to shrink or eliminate the government housing bureaucracy. The commission proposed to replace existing federal programs with unrestricted block grants to states and, more important, vouchers paid directly to low-income tenants who could exercise their consumer sovereignty in the housing marketplace. Moving to vouchers would be less expensive, according to the report, and "relatively simple and straightforward." 45 Anticipating the argument that the federal government could improve existing service delivery systems, the McKenna report said the federal government was incapable of reform. "Officials in government agencies and organizations often perceive change as a threat to competing public concerns or to their own personal interests." 46 More bureaucracy could not solve the "knotty" problems of the inner-city slums identified by the Kaiser report; only the market could do that. Entrepreneurs, not bureaucrats, would rebuild slums once they were unleashed from government red tape and provided tax breaks in so-called enterprise zones. "In enterprise zones the approach is to relax governmental controls, reduce taxes, modify regulations, and remove other inhibitions on business investment." 47 McKenna's report, like the Kaiser report, envisioned a role for state and local governments to play in providing housing. Unlike Kaiser, however, McKenna could look back on a decade of innovation and institution building on the state level and affirm that states rather than the federal government could play a more important role in solving housing policy problems. The report urged creative use of both general obligation bonds and tax-exempt revenue bonds to generate capital for subsidized apartment buildings in addition to below-market interest rate mortgages for first-time homebuyers. "There is now in existence both a network of marketing channels for tax-exempt housing bonds and a corresponding set of institutional arrangements for using the bond proceeds in the production of multifamily housing for low-and moderate-income households and the financing of single-family homes." 48 Since the main thrust of the McKenna report was for a government retreat from housing, the most important changes to federal housing policy that followed were reduced budgets. The Reagan administration cut appropriations for federally assisted housing programs dramatically from $31.9 billion to $9.4 billion between 1981 and 1987. 49 But by 1987, the political climate that inspired the market-only approach of the McKenna report began to wane. Democrats once again controlled the Senate, and even George H. W. Bush acknowledged a need for government to take a stronger role in social welfare services, particularly when new approaches appeared inexpensive and squared with the conservative political tenets of local control and faith in markets.
Subsidized Housing's 1988 "New Wave"
The economic and physical health of cities did not improve in the 1980s. It became increasingly clear that the market and local government were not up to the challenge of housing the nation's low-income tenants. In 1988, congressional leaders created another commission to reexamine the nation's housing problems. The National Housing Task Force was drawn "from business, banking, community service, and state and local government" and led by James Rouse, a successful real estate developerturned-philanthropist, and David Maxwell, chief executive officer of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae).
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The 1988 report, known as the Maxwell/Rouse report, was cautiously optimistic. Growing confidence came from the fact that state and local government, along with nonprofit and private corporations, managed to do innovative and important work during the difficult financial times of the early 1980s. It advocated a renewed federal government commitment to housing that could invigorate "new alliances among the public, private and community sectors" in what the report described as a "new wave" for housing policy. "Vigorous and diverse," the new alliance, "raises new possibilities and new hope for housing low-and moderateincome families." 51 As promising as the new approach to housing was, the report argued, it would never succeed without an infusion of federal money and leadership. "The 80 percent decline in HUD funds for new housing commitments over the past decade has hindered the growth of this new system to deliver affordable housing." If this approach were to be comprehensive and effective, it would need new energy, leadership, and financial support from the federal government.
Policymakers proposed a variety of financing tools to make this approach more effective. "We have learned, over the last quarter century, that housing problems are varied and complex. To be effective, housing assistance must assume different forms." 52 These different forms included boosting the consuming power of low-income tenants with vouchers and a variety of housing construction finance strategies that included low-interest loans, loan guarantees, tax incentives, and federal insurance. One of the most important new financing tools proposed was a new block-grant program, which eventually became the HOME Investment Partnerships (HOME) program. HOME, in some respects, was modeled on CDBG. The block-grant program was meant to have few strings attached, but it did have specific performance goals, a requirement for local government to contribute matching funds, and, most important, dedicated funds for nonprofit CDCs. 53 The report concluded that nonprofits brought new perspective and commitment to low-income tenants and their communities: "They offer more than just numbers. They know local housing needs and are committed to serving them. They are determined to serve low-income residents on a long-term basis. They are willing to take on projects that are considered too risky or too small by financial institutions and other developers." 54 Recognizing that this multitude of nonprofits needed outside expertise, the report suggested building on the model established by existing nonprofit capacity-building organizations such as the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) and the Enterprise Foundation. Both groups were founded to help build institutional capacity for smaller nonprofits. Larger regional nonprofits, like LISC, the report claimed, "play a critical capacity-building role, help structure project financing, identify ways to cut construction costs, and encourage alliances between local nonprofit developers and state and local governments." 55 The report concluded that new government agencies, in combination with dedicated nonprofit and for-profit developers along with capacitybuilding consultants, would develop a creative and vigorous housing development network. This network would be adaptive, innovative, and capable of combining new tools "in hundreds of different ways in hundreds of different places." 56 Section II: "New Wave" Politics: The Fight for Funds, 1986 Funds, -1996 The Maxwell/Rouse report shaped the debate over two measures that became the financial foundation for the decentralized approach to housing: the National Affordable Housing Act of 1990 (NAHA) and the LowIncome Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program. The policy debates at this time took place against the backdrop of several other events and trends of the late 1980s that promoted the decentralized welfare state. The trends included: (1) the ideology of what George Bush called a "kinder and gentler" conservatism and a growing confidence-even among liberals-in market-based models for social policy; (2) the budget-balancing efforts of the late 1980s, including statutory, formula-driven budgetbalancing requirements; (3) the increasingly visible problem of homelessness and the rising cost of housing, even for the middle class; (4) Democratic political control of both houses of Congress after 1986, and; (5) the high-profile HUD and Savings and Loan corruption scandals. The country was disgusted by the multibillion-dollar bailout of the Savings and Loan industry. And public policy professor and former HUD undersecretary Michael A. Stegman observed that public confidence in HUD plunged after "periodic ethical lapses at the highest levels of HUD-including the criminal indictment during the Reagan administration of a sitting HUD secretary who reportedly was so bored that he spent some afternoons watching soap operas." 57 President Bush promised "a kinder and gentler nation" at the same time as he promised "no new taxes." The spirit was willing, but the budget was weak. As the reporter for the Congressional Quarterly wrote, no one "in Congress has figured out how Bush can reconcile the conflicting imperatives of increased social spending and the steady deficit reduction required by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law." On the other hand, even though there were those who would doubt the ability to achieve this mix, there were few who would doubt its political effectiveness. By appealing to compassionate-conservative themes, Bush hoped to bring more women voters to the Republican party. 58 While the Senate banking committee was debating the bill that would ultimately become NAHA, Republican and Democratic leaders from the House, Senate, and White House were engaged in the so-called budget summit, a budget-cutting exercise. The behind-closed-doors negotiations were designed to facilitate the tough decisions on spending reductions and tax increases necessary to balance the federal budget, and this cast a shadow over the NAHA debates. The "money we are going to have to spend on housing ultimately, apparently, is going to be determined by our colleagues and those in the administration who are in the budget summit," according to Senator Kit Bond (R-Mo.). 59 Interestingly, there was a considerable amount of discussion on direct expenditures and their budgetary effect in this debate, but virtually no discussion of the fiscal impact of indirect expenditures such as tax credits (for example, the LIHTC program). The senators made it sound as though tax credits were free money. 60 The House sponsor of housing legislation, House Banking Committee Chairman Henry Gonzales (D-Tex.), disagreed with the decentralized approach to housing. "The patchwork system of tax credits and piecemeal funding from states, local governments and the federal government, as innovative as it may be, often results in significant leakage of subsidy funds. This makes the system less efficient and more complicated to the direct spending approach." 61 Despite such objections, the final bill emerged from the conference committee largely unchanged from the Senate version. The compromise bill passed the Senate 93-6 and the House by a voice vote. The National Affordable Housing Act of 1990 was signed into law by President George H. W. Bush on October 27 and authorized $27.5 billion in fiscal 1991 and $29.9 billion in fiscal 1992. These amounts represented a direct expenditure increase of $3 billion. The centerpiece of the legislation was the new HOME Investment Partnership program. 62 The increase in direct-expenditure dollars for low-income housing programs was achieved thanks to an unprecedented level of agreement over housing policy. One senator called this new agreement a "marriage" of philosophies.
63 It is not clear that this was an entirely happy marriage, but in the 1980s there was overwhelming agreement, from liberals and conservatives, that any new housing programs would have to be antibureaucratic, enthusiastic about using market mechanisms whenever possible, and interested in an expanded role for nonprofits in service delivery.
Despite the fact that there was massive federal funding of local initiatives, there was something about local groups meeting their own housing needs, even with increased federal funding, that seemed to fit the Republican affinity for individual initiative. "As I go across our Nation," Jack Kemp, observed, "I see non-profits, neighborhood groups, and community housing efforts taking the boards off vacant and foreclosed property, rehabilitating that property . . . often through sweat equity . . . and turning thousands of dilapidated houses to decent, quality housing for low-income people." 64 NAHA was a multibillion-dollar subsidized housing program with a Horatio Alger feel.
Both conservatives and liberals embraced nonprofits because they were perceived as incorruptible, caring, and efficient. Senator Robert Kasten (R-Wis.) contrasted funding for nonprofits favorably to more funding for HUD, which he said would only "expand HUD programs and policies which are the same magnets for the waste, fraud, abuse, and influence peddling that we all claim to deplore." 65 Most senators agreed with the Maxwell/Rouse report describing nonprofits as rooted in and rooting for their communities. Senator Connie Mack (R-Fla.) explained that "nonprofits are of, by and for the people of the community." Mack contrasted "HUD's massive, distant bureaucracy" against nonprofits that "consist largely of local people who care about their communities and who are sensitive to local needs."
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Most senators also agreed that corporations-both for profit and nonprofit-responding to market signals would be the saviors of the inner city. Senator Charles Grassley (R-Ia.) said, "We have the opportunity to say no to excessive Government bureaucracy. We have the opportunity to vote for a piece of legislation that will unleash the free market system toward providing affordable housing for areas of the country that are being restricted from this goal." 67 Confidence in the anticipated efficiency and equity of this new decentralized approach to delivering housing ran high. Consider Senator Rudy Boschwitzs (R-Minn.) comments: "The private sector will also create and rehabilitate low-income housing cheaper than the Federal Government can, and without the potential for corruption or mismanagement." 69 Jack Kemp claimed that capitalism's triumph over communism in Eastern Europe must have a similar victory in high poverty areas of American cities. "As Berliners tear down the wall that has kept them from freedom for 28 years, so too must we tear down the walls that are keeping Americas poor from the blessings of freedom and democracy in our own country." 70 Winning the Cold War will not be complete if there is no win in the inner city, according to Kemp: "I can't help but feel that history has linked the cause of freedom abroad with the cause of freedom, dignity, and justice right here in Americas ghettoes and barrios in one great cause for good."
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Connecticut Democrat Christopher Dodd saw HOME as empowering local communities. It was "consolidating several rigid categorical programs into a more flexible block grant approach. Home [HOME] requires cities and states to identify their housing needs, and then channels Federal money to them to be used in ways that they-not Washingtonthink best."
72 Maryland Democrat Paul Sarbanes agreed, acknowledging the important role of the Maxwell/Rouse report in shaping the new HOME program. Sarbanes said that HOME "is really a partnership with State and local governments, nonprofit groups, and others who are best suited to develop housing solutions in each area of our country." 73 Even an ardent low-income housing advocate like Barry Zigas, of the National Low Income Housing Coalition, could call the measure "a good step forward," adding, "It's not enough, but it's a substantial step forward from the last decade." 74 Perhaps the greatest achievement and legacy of the act was that it acknowledged and provided fresh resources to the decentralized network of housing delivery to help it evolve as an institution. Don Campbell, staff director of the Senate Housing Subcommittee, said that in the past too much attention was given to particular programs-their rules and regulations, the target groups, outcomes measures, and so forth. Campbell said that focus was misplaced. The individual programs were too rigid. What NAHA provided was a new network of more nimble institutions. 
Low-Income Housing Tax Credits
Barry Zigas, the executive director of the National Low Income Housing Coalition, introduced the idea of housing tax credits to Senator Bob Packwood's (R-Ore.) staff, who was writing drafts of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86). Zigas said progressive housing activists and the senator's staff preferred tax credits as a more targeted subsidy over the generous tax subsidies in the prior revenue bill, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. 76 According to Zigas, many housing activists were wary of tax credits, but after the Reagan cutbacks there was a sense that "if we lose this [tax credits], there will be nothing." 77 It was the Senate staffers who were most excited about the more targeted tax credit. They joined with Zigas and housing activists in promoting that policy and they had a champion in George Mitchell (D-Me.). In time, and with some adjustments, the real estate industry saw the credit as a worthwhile compromise. 78 In the end, Congress included the Senate version of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program in TRA 86 as a three-year demonstration project.
Although many housing advocates initially were skeptical of the tax credits, support grew. "At the time, I don't think many people thought this program was going to amount to much because it had been done on the quick with little research," William Apgar, acting director of the Joint Center for Housing at Harvard, remarked. "But the states and the nonprofits and others have learned how to take this credit and make it into housing." 79 By 1989, the New York Times could editorialize that while "the housing industry originally doubted the effectiveness of the tax credit plan, results have surpassed even optimistic predictions."
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The LIHTC is a tax coupon to corporate investors who provide equity capital to build apartment buildings that are rented to low-income tenants. To be considered "low income," one must earn less than 50 to 60 percent of the local area's median income as measured by an annual county-by-county survey by HUD. The amount of tax equity that goes into a project can vary, but it rarely is more than 60 percent of the necessary funds for construction. Additional funds typically come from federal block grants-HOME and CDBG. The final piece of financing is typically a mortgage from a private credit provider (usually a bank) that is sized to the limited cash flow coming from tenants' reduced rents.
As with NAHA, conservatives joined liberals in support of the tax credit. A 1989 column in the Wall Street Journal called on HUD Secretary Jack Kemp to support the credits:
If experience has taught us anything, it is that government-built and controlled housing is fraught with fundamental weaknesses, not the least of which is the basic inefficiency of the bureaucracy in maintaining properties and the frequent failure of such housing to provide safe, or even humane places to live. Mr. Kemp shares that view. The looming question, then, is whether in spite of his aversion to tampering further with the tax code, he will swallow a broad program of tax incentives in order to inspire an alternative. 81 Kemp did indeed swallow the tax credit program. In the hearings of the tax-law-writing Housing Ways and Means Committee, Kemp urged the Committee Chairman Charles Rangel to "rise above the left-right debate and find consensus as to what our Nation can do to fight poverty."
82 Kemp went on to praise both liberals and conservatives on the committee for their "willingness to walk away from ideology."
83 Liberals on the committee, like Rangel, could voice their opposition and still embrace Kemp's proposals. Rangel said, "I am outraged at some of the things that have happened to my country in the last eight years, but you have to play the hand that is dealt you." 84 True to his statement, Rangel spent a great deal of time during the hearing to see how to make tax credits more attractive. "We are just here to make certain that we can provide the incentives that are necessary to the investors." 85 Rangel and Kemp received ample feedback from the business community. Several of the country's largest financial and real estate industry firms also testified in the LIHTC hearings, including Lehman Brothers, Boston Capital, and a representative of the Association of Home Builders, a lobbying group that represented 157,000 home builders nationwide.
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The for-profit business community lobbied that housing tax credits were good for business. According to the National Real Estate Investor magazine, out of 250,000 apartment buildings that began construction in 1994, 100,000 were financed with the help of LIHTC. 87 A Wall Street Journal article in 1992 explained that the LIHTC provided much needed help during the recession of the early 1990s. The tax credit program "staved off a lot of bankruptcies in the industry that would have occurred without the program," said Martin Flounoy, chairman of the builders committee at the National Apartment Association. 88 The article concluded that a "broad coalition of real estate industry and not-for-profit groups are lobbying the president to sign the bill" to extend the tax credit program permanently.
Another Wall Street Journal article explained that many Fortune 500 companies were eager to purchase housing credits. James H. Ross, president of BP America (a subsidiary of British Petroleum), said the return on investment for tax credits was "reasonably competitive" with other corporate investments. In fact, the returns on capital invested in this program in the late 1980s and 1990s averaged 20 percent-a return higher than junk bonds.
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Affordable housing advocates also made their voices heard. One advocate who managed to generate considerable press coverage was Paul Grogan, president of LISC. In a 1991 press conference with U.S. mayors, Grogan said that LIHTC was "directly responsible for the creation of 120,000 homes for the poor annually in this country. This program has only been in existence since 1987, but we believe it to be the most successful federal housing program in history." 90 In a Washington Post op-ed, Grogan compared the advantages of the tax credit program with those of the Great Society housing programs. "While the Great Society programs of the 1960s had many positive results, they also showed the limitations of the top-down approach. But the federal government does have a role, mostly through flexible programs that support and encourage community initiative." 91 Although housing advocates testified in favor of LIHTC, there were divisions within the ranks on whether to push for an LIHTC extension. Some activists wanted government to stop a program they perceived to be a shell game and that in the end was more beneficial to wealthy taxpayers than to low-income tenants. Others, however, saw it as both politically popular and good public policy. The housing activist magazine Shelterforce-started as a pro-housing collective in the 1970s-aired both sides of the debate in 1992. On the one side was Chester Hartman and on the other, Paul Grogan and Benson Roberts of LISC. 92 Hartman, executive director of the Poverty and Race Research Council, questioned the logic of tax-expenditure support for affordable housing. Much of his criticism stemmed from his central question: "Why do something indirectly rather than directly?" In addition, he said tax credits were so complex that they were almost by design an effort to shift power from activists at the community level to technocrats and "middlemen." 93 His strongest criticism, however, was over the method of subsidy delivery: "It is unseemly and redistributively unjust to help the poor by helping the rich-those upper-income investors and big corporations that avoid paying parts of their income taxes by offsetting these obligations via investment in low income housing." This program seemed to reward "rich investors" by providing photo opportunities with mayors, lowincome tenants, and housing advocates-all a charade for participating in a lucrative tax scheme.
Paul Grogan, as head of LISC, was involved in selling tens of millions of dollars of those tax credits and he disagreed with Hartman. In the same issue of Shelterforce, his article, entitled "Good Policy, Good Politics," praised the multilayer approach to financing. 94 Grogan and Roberts wrote that in 1985, when the idea of tax credits was introduced, they were skeptical. But since it was the only option politically, they endorsed it. Since then, however, they had become converts. They addressed Hartman's points about the fairness of the credit, explaining that it was true that rich investors were the ones that could make use of the credit, but they paid a fair price to participate in the program: "If it lets them do well while doing good, if it broadens political support for good social policy, that's a plus, not a minus." 95 More than politics, the participation of private-sector investors helped create better housing according to Grogan and Roberts. Under the old programs, private owners with little or no investment stake in the project were likely to "walk away" at the first sign of trouble. But the tax credit program delivered (in theory) significant penalties to investors if the project had problems for at least the first fifteen years of operation.
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"That kind of performance incentive means that housing will be planned, built and managed to last. No wonder Congress likes it," they wrote.
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Tax credits also offered flexibility, according to Grogan and Roberts. Credits could be used for many different housing types, and communities, "not some federal bureaucracy," determined its uses. And while it was complicated, it was not wasteful according to the authors. Compare this program with previous Washington-based ones, they wrote: "Just ask any CDC that has had to spend 15 months of staff time getting a federal agency to sign off on a project the city and state have already approved. A thinly capitalized CDC could die before the project goes through federal approvals. Not to mention the costs of having to re-bid construction contracts that have expired in the meantime or the cost of federal agency staff and the consultants retained to satisfy them." 98 It is not often that one thinks of nonprofit groups and major corporations as political allies, but it dramatizes the fact that moderates and liberals came together over tax expenditure programs. It was not simply that liberals were "playing the hand they were dealt" as Rangel saw it. Housing advocates like Patrick Clancy, executive director of Greater Boston Community Development, Inc., a community-based development corporation, agreed with Grogan that the tax code was the best vehicle for housing subsidy: "Those producing affordable housing can achieve more direct access to assistance with less bureaucratic inefficiency through investment incentives than if the same assistance is provided through direct expenditures." 99 John Simon, president of the pro-tenant National Housing Conference, also agreed with Clancy and Grogan that housing needed a new approach that minimized the role of federal bureaucracies-especially HUD. "As I said once before, HUD stands for 'Help Us Delay,' but we hope that a future HUD will be more efficient and be able to do the things that they have not done in the past, rather than having to create another agency. I agree . . . we don't have the time to develop a new program, a new bureaucracy." Simon endorsed a plan to build on an existing network that was made stronger, larger, and more effective with new federal resources like the tax credit.
The Fight for Permanent LIHTC Extension
It was clear that the tax credit program had broad support, but it still had to fight for resources during a period of belt-tightening. In 1991, when Charles Rangel introduced legislation to extend tax credits permanently, he went to great lengths to explain how the program had been improved with new oversight to guard against graft and corruption in the program. Looking back on five years of the program, Rangel said:
The credit has also fulfilled one of the original goals of its framers; to encourage additional government and private sector support for housing. It has successfully created a partnership with state and local governments and nonprofit groups who have supplemented the credit with additional assistance. States and local governments are providing subsidies, low interest loans, land, tax abatements among other forms of assistance. Nonprofits are organizing tenant and community groups to empower people on their way to providing housing for themselves and their neighbors.
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By 1991, the network of housing providers understood their connection to one another and lobbied effectively as a group. Rangel included a letter in the Congressional Record that was signed by more than five hundred community-based housing nonprofits from across the nation. The letter both urged Congress to extend the tax credit and praised the role of for-profit corporations as part of the network of affordable housing providers. Affordable housing "requires the kinds of creative solutions and especially the private sector involvement that the Credit has stimulated."
101 Left in the wild, these groups are natural enemies, but by 1991 they recognized that their political and economic futures were linked.
Again, the familiar cadre of subnational government and privatesector firms joined housing advocates to push for a permanent extension of LIHTC. A New York Times article entitled "Tax-Credit Program on Borrowed Time" showcased this diverse coalition. Republic National Bank's executive vice president John Tamberlane was quoted urging support for the program because it "benefits the bank with significant tax credits," and "it benefits the community by providing affordable, rehabilitated apartments for individuals with low and very low incomes." 102 Also quoted in the article was John McEvoy, executive director of the National Council of State Housing Agencies, who claimed that the few who opposed the program did so over concern for its cost, not over the effectiveness of the program. 103 New York City mayor David Dinkins claimed that cities needed LIHTC to be made permanent if it were to be effective: "The annual lobbying to extend the credit has a detrimental effect on the production of affordable housing." Grogan added, "No one could rely on assurances or raise any capital if the program isn't there at the end of the year." Such an array of advocates-mayors, bankers, state government bureaucrats, and housing activists-demonstrated that broad interests were working in concert to save LIHTC.
The Los Angeles riots in the spring of 1992 also gave weight to efforts for new urban-relief initiatives, including the permanent extension of the tax credit. In an editorial, the Los Angeles Times argued that the "riots changed the political climate and put the problems of cities back on the national agenda." The urban initiative did pass in the House, and going into the debate in the Senate more than eighty senators were on record in support of permanent LIHTC extension. 104 Echoing sentiments in editorials in the New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal, the Los Angeles Times wrote: "The tax break deserves renewal because it remains the primary federal resource for financing additional new and affordable housing. It also forms the cornerstone of the numerous public/private partnerships that are increasingly the salvation of cash-short cities and states." 105 The permanent extension passed in 1993, but that was not the end of the story. The new Republican congressional majority in 1994 was on a crusade to cut the federal budget and simplify the tax code. The new chair of the House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee, Bill Archer (R-Tex.), vowed to cut the housing tax credit. 106 To strengthen his case, Archer claimed the credits were an inefficient use of federal money. He cited a critical report by the IRS as justification for doing away with the program. The IRS estimated that "fraud in the amount of approximately $6.0 billion could be associated with alleged abuses of the program" 107 The IRS withdrew this report, however, admitting that it was flawed.
As Archer's evidence evaporated, so did his political allies in Congress. Moderate Republicans flocked to LIHTC. Jack Metcalf (R-Wash.) founded a Republican affordable housing caucus and was joined by others members, including Nancy Johnson (R-Conn.), Rick Lazio (R-N.Y.), Jerry Weller (R-Ill.), and Phil English (R-Pa.). 108 The goals of the caucus were "to encourage the development of innovative, cost effective and efficient approaches to providing affordable housing." Their charge was to "blend the energy and capital of industry with the public spirit of government and the incentives we can offer through law," Metcalf said. 109 Among those who made up this caucus' advisory committee were Paul Grogan of LISC, John McEvoy of the National Council State Housing Agencies, and F. Barton Harvey III, CEO of the Enterprise Foundation. The advisory committee was also staffed by representatives from Boston Capital, the National Association of Home Builders, and the National Association of Realtors. Lazio, who was also the chair of the House Banking Committee's housing subcommittee, said, "The tax credit does everything that we Republicans say we want to do with housing. It puts private capital at risk. It leverages public dollars. It ensures income mix." 110 As we have seen before, when the interests of the decentralized housing network were challenged, the coalition to save the program proved to be a formidable opponent. In the fall of 1995, LISC and the Enterprise Foundation rallied the supporters of tax credits-mayors and governors, Wall Street investors, consultants, CDCs, banks, and corporations-to oppose House Ways and Means Committee Chair Archer's efforts.
Antipoverty activists also joined the battle against Archer. John Taylor, president of the National Community Reinvestment Coalition, said that Archer's attack "just reveals the absolute lack of commitment by this Congress to housing the poor."
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In the fight against Archer, banks were important allies. "Dozens of banks" rallied to protect LIHTC, "including First Chicago Corp., Chemical Bank, and Wachovia Corp," according to an article in the Journal of Housing and Community Development. The executive vice president at Bank of America, Donald Mullane, said, "We believe people should have safe, clean, and affordable housing. As a matter of social policy, it is a good thing. This program [LIHTC] is a win for the community, a win for us, and it is a win for our shareholders."
112 Banks also had extra incentive to invest in credits because they were able to make a good tax-saving investment and get credit for complying with the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA). The Journal of Housing and Community Development wrote, "The combination of CRA compliance credit, attractive effective yields and goodwill created from investing in the local community makes the investment in tax credit projects increasingly popular for many banking institutions." 113 The coalition to save the tax credit was broad and diverse, but it was also sophisticated. As an example of how proponents of poverty programs could play the lobby game in a way that would make a defense contractor blush, the Wall Street Journal reported that tax-credit advocates were making donations to political allies of Archer's in an effort to sway him on LIHTC. The Wall Street Journal reported that Herb Collins, a top executive at Boston Capital, was leading the lobbying efforts to save the credit. He arranged meetings with tax-credit investors and Archer. According to one investor, Collins instructed those with a stake in the program to make contributions to the congressional campaign of Archer's son-inlaw. 114 For the first time, a federal poverty program was in the knife fight of budget politics, armed with a knife.
Archer's sunset proposal was part of the House version of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1995 that was famously vetoed by President Clinton. The political tug-of-war led to the temporary shutdown of the U.S. government, a situation that voters largely blamed on Republicans in Congress. A CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll found that 48 percent blamed the Republican Congress as opposed to 26 percent who blamed Clinton.
115 Bipartisan lobbying removed the sunset provision from the compromise budget legislation. Archer had tried to reintroduce the sunset proposal to kill LIHTC in the compromise legislation, but according to the National Real Estate Investor, "he backed off after the credit received a strong endorsement from both Republican and Democratic members of his committee." 116 After the budget was passed, the Journal of Housing and Community Development wrote, "There appears to be no imminent threat to the tax credit program, and it would not be surprising to see additional growth in affordable housing through investment spurred by the program."
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Archer backed down from any further attacks on the LIHTC program after 1996. In April 1997, the General Accounting Office published a highly positive report on LIHTC. Many saw this as a vindication of the program that had come so close to termination. "After reviewing the GAO report," Archer conceded, "it appears that the housing projects using the credit are benefiting the right people-households with very low incomes." The number of housing units built under the decentralized housing approach is hard to measure. There is some double and triple counting of units because HOME, CDBG, and the tax-credit programs all can claim credit for the same apartment. However, if we consider only the apartments funded under the LIHTC program, a survey by the National Council of State Housing Agencies (NCSHA) estimates that number to be 1.3 million. According to NCSHA's Web site, "The Housing Credit induces about $6 billion of private investment each year to produce more than 115,000 apartments with rents affordable to low-income families."
119 Congress increased federal tax expenditures for LIHTC by 40 percent in 2001, and future allocations are indexed to inflation. HOME funds have been a similarly effective tool for building housing, and this program has been a political winner. HUD estimates that HOME has financed nearly 400,000 affordable housing units since the funds first started flowing in 1992. 120 The percentage of those units built by nonprofit CDCs is also remarkably high. A survey by the Urban Institute and the National Congress for Community Economic Development estimated that by 1997 the total number of CDC-built units was 550,000. 121 Thousands of new housing-related CDCs came into existence during the 1980s and 1990s. The report estimated that there were 2,850 CDCs in the nation building affordable housing as of 1997.
122 Almost all these CDCs received some federal funding, and most received the majority of their financial support from three programs: LIHTC, HOME and CDBG. 123 The greatest concentration of CDC activity has been in the Northeast, the Great Lakes region, and the West Coast. But as early as 1990, 95 percent of U.S. cities reported having active CDC housing developers. 124 State and local governments were also innovating. At the time of the Kaiser report, no state had a housing finance agency capable of either making low-interest loans or executing other subsidy programs for affordable housing developers. Now all fifty have them, along with Washington, D.C., Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. According to the National Council of State Housing Finance Agencies' Web site, these agencies "have financed more than 1.9 million low-and moderate-income apartments."
125 Don Terner, the founder of BRIDGE Housing, the country's largest nonprofit housing developer, wrote that states had become the new engine for housing policy innovation in a paper that became part of the Maxwell/Rouse report. "In the last six years , states have responded with more than 300 new housing programs, which run the gamut from emergency homeless shelters to rural housing rehabilitation to builder incentives for affordable housing." 126 Cities and counties became more sophisticated too, since they were now distributing block grants from Washington in addition to local funds from local taxes.
Capacity building and consulting nonprofits provided increasingly sophisticated financial products, advising on how to structure new types of transactions and real estate development strategies. LISC and Enterprise are now joined by scores of similar smaller for-profit and nonprofit firms that operate on a local or regional level.
All the major banks developed community-lending groups that specialized in subsidized housing loans, motivated by business opportunities, public relations, and the requirements of the Community Reinvestment Act. Most major Wall Street financial firms along with philanthropychartered public purpose financial firms developed expertise in how to use the housing tax credit, tax-exempt bonds, and other financial tools for low-income housing transactions.
Strengths and Weaknesses
The decentralized approach was politically resilient. The ideology behind it was flexible enough to draw adherents from across the political spectrum: LIHTC, for example, could be billed as tax relief for conservatives, an efficiency measure for moderates, or as a way to empower local activists with federal resources for liberals. It appeared to be "above the left-right debate," as Jack Kemp observed.
The political coalition behind the new programs was also strong. HUD was a massive federal bureaucracy whose biggest constituency were low-income tenants. Bureaucrats and the poor hardly make a winning lobbying team. The decentralized network, by contrast, had many friends in both the public and private sectors. 127 In a 1997 article in the Journal of the American Planning Association, housing scholar Avis Vidal noted, "These new partners in housing production have changed the political climate surrounding affordable housing in subtle but critical ways. At the federal level, the fact that the banking industry and a diverse array of major corporations support the low-income housing tax credit gives it unusual breadth of support." 128 An example from the current budget battle makes this point. In January 2005, the National Journal reported that many Republican believed that their party's number-one concern was to show "fiscal restraint for our base." 129 Early in this year's budget cycle, one program that appeared to be vulnerable to cuts was CDBG. The $4.7 billion program was slated to take a 50 percent reduction according to congressional housing aides in a February 2005 article in the Washington Post.
130 As soon as President Bush's budget was released with its proposed cuts to CDBG, however, government, nonprofit, and corporate organizations successfully defended the program, sparing CDBG deep cuts in the 2006 budget. 131 It may be too early to talk about the social-service industrial complex, but the decentralized welfare state is developing an impressive track record of defending itself.
The decentralized approach to housing was good politics and good policy, as Paul Grogan put it. The network delivered housing that was better suited to local needs, thanks in large part to the program's marketlike mechanisms. The old subsidized-housing system had a one-size-fits-all philosophy, exemplified by the monotonous apartment buildings it built. The new system, with its multiple players, understood its "customers" better, and therefore was able to modify its designs, procedures, and products to serve local communities with a higher-quality and lower-cost "product". To some extent, this was true because every new transaction (that is, every new apartment building) required many partners who shared financial and real estate risk. With each component engaged in its own feasibility analyses, all the players were constantly evaluating one another. The competition among the diverse components of the system kept costs downsalaries, overhead, and construction-without the cumbersome cost regulations and sloppy enforcement common in the old system.
The network innovated in terms of what types of apartments were built. It built architecturally interesting buildings, shifted between largefamily and single-room occupancy (SRO) projects depending on changing demographics, targeted niche housing projects that were part of larger urban redevelopment efforts, and mixed low-income with market-rate units in projects designed to bring the middle class back to downtown locations. 132 There were still many obstacles to developing affordable housing, but the decentralized approach was adaptable and nimble in overcoming local political opponents and construction difficulties. Diverse development teams often had the wherewithal to overcome local opposition to development (the so-called Not in My Backyard, or NIMBY syndrome), to negotiate preferential financing terms, and to fix most development delays with an entrepreneur's enthusiasm.
The nonprofit part of this network was motivated by a "double bottom line" (both social and economic returns) that drove them to achieve better and cheaper results on the behalf of low-income tenants. The forprofit part of the network set high standards for efficiency and effectiveness. Each part, in certain respects, kept the other honest and effective.
Shared goals, mutual understanding, and past successes built trust in the network and so lowered transaction costs. In addition, the different components of the network worked well together because staff members often jumped from institution to institution (for example, from government to CDCs, from for-profit to government). This insight that individuals in the network had of each other's organizations' goals and objectives was strengthened because many of them sat on each other's boards of directors.
Network effects helped make communities stronger too. Local CDCs, for example, bridged to other institutions outside their neighborhoods (such as local banks and city hall) and provided employment ladders where local CDC workers might find themselves with the skills to work in a bank or the city's redevelopment agency. David Garrison observed that in housing-related corporations and cities across the country, one could find staff that got their start in neighborhood CDCs. Programs like the decentralized approach to housing were not "just a matter of developing capacity, it was opening up the process for people to access these jobs and become involved as a career path in this [housing and community development] work."
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As impressive as the gains from the decentralization have been, its legacy is mixed. The greatest weakness was that it did not solve the housing problem for low-income Americans. HUD measures the number of families who pay more than 50 percent of their income in rent-a category they call "worst case needs." From 1991 to 1999, the number of worst-case needs increased slightly from 4.8 million to 4.9 million households. 134 Any subsidized housing program would have struggled against three larger trends that contributed to increasing rent burdens: (1) the declining wages of lower-income workers, (2) increasing immigration of very low income people, and (3) local efforts to limit the supply of affordable housing (NIMBYism). For all its popularity and efficiencies, the decentralized housing network was losing the battle to house the neediest Americans.
The program had the same problem of fairness that earlier housing programs generated; only a fraction of eligible tenants got subsidized apartments. And apartments in the new program were often targeted to the working poor, not the neediest cases. Those who were lucky enough to get an apartment enjoyed a product that was above the market in terms of its construction quality and amenities. These apartments were built cost-effectively, but they were also expensive (averaging over $100,000 per apartment in high-demand areas such as California, New York, and New England). 135 Another problem has been inconsistency. Local networks varied in their effectiveness depending on local characteristics such as skill, drive, and organization. Some were energetic and effective and others were parochial, myopic, poorly capitalized, and ineffective. As a result, whether a community had access to quality low-income housing rested on the luck of the draw. Some areas-New England, the West Coast, and upper Great Lakes regions-tended to have more sophisticated and capable housingdelivery networks.
The decentralized program lacked transparency, which in some instances was a political advantage, but it contributed to a growing misunderstanding of the relationship of citizens to their government and its programs. An example of the growing disconnect was typified by an elderly focus-group participant who said, "I want the government off my back. . . . I don't want the government messing around with my Medicare." 136 This disconnect generated problems of accountability and also made it hard to build enthusiasm and broad-based political support. Very few Americans know that nearly every city in this country is dotted with high-quality, government-subsidized apartment buildings. It is hard to rally voters around such a shadowy program. In other words, it lacks the focus of FDR's fourth freedom-the Freedom from Want-that gave weight to the New Deal coalition's efforts to establish a more comprehensive welfare state based on the ideology of economic citizenship. 137 In prior policy eras, if people disagreed with a government program, they could show their dissatisfaction by trying to punish or influence policymakers. Dramatic examples of this were marches on Washington, D.C, or protests outside state capitols or city halls. Under the new decentralized program, it was not always clear where one would go to demonstrate. Now there is nowhere to march.
Conclusion
Charles Jencks, the author of the best-selling The Language of Post-Modern Architecture, dates the end of modernism precisely: 3:32 P.M. on July 15, 1972 , when the federal government dynamited the Pruitt-Igoe lowincome housing development in St. Louis. Although Pruitt-Igoe started out as an award-winning modernist design of high-rise apartment buildings, it became dangerous and uninhabitable for its low-income tenants. 138 In a similar vein, the 1970s were the end of the Weberian modernist ideal of government bureaucracies solving social problems. Thanks in part to CDBG and the subsequent decentralized funding mechanisms, a new network of policy development and implementation began to grow in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1980s, with Ronald Reagan, it appeared that this growth might have been stunted. But something unexpected happened-federal cuts seemed to spur the system.
In many respects, the decentralized housing network was a synthesis from the two prior eras of housing policy. In the 1960s and early 1970s, it appeared that Washington-based and bureaucracy-led efforts might solve the housing crisis. When this approach had problems and lost political support, a subsequent policy regime led by Ronald Reagan preached government retreat and the value of market-led efforts to solve the housing problem. An unforeseen response to this policy regime was an explosion of efforts from nonprofits and housing activists, local government, and elements of the private sector at the local level that built some affordable housing without federal help. It was in the third policy era (1986-96), when a synthesis emerged from the bureaucracy-led thesis and the market-led antithesis. In the third period, housing advocates and policymakers used federal resources to create a quasi market by providing tax incentives and block grants to promote low-income housing production. The local network responded to this inflow of new resources with vigor and continually improved its production capabilities and capacity.
This success made the program politically popular for both liberals and conservatives. Instead of a narrowly defined program, it was a vibrant, adaptive institution that demonstrated considerable resolve and creativity in delivering affordable housing. The political debates over the decentralized approach to housing were much different from prior eras, when conservatives opposed government programs and liberals promoted them. In this third era, politics was more characterized by agreement between liberals and conservatives. Part of this was driven by political necessity, playing "the hand that was dealt you," as Democrat Rangel, obliged to work with a Republican administration, saw it. In later years, however, even ardent housing activists came to embrace the decentralized approach.
As an institution, the decentralized housing network developed out of the changing political realities of the 1980s and 1990s. The network helps explain that one of the most important trends of the last thirty years of welfare state history has not been its dismantling, as many studies suggest. There is no doubt that the welfare state has suffered setbacks and some funding cuts. The welfare state has also maintained its mean distinction between relatively generous subsidies for the middle class-social insurance programs, mortgage interest deduction, and so forth-and miserly ones for the poor. The most dramatic change of the last thirty years, however, has not been over funding, but in how and to whom welfare state services are delivered. The lines among government, the private sector, and nonprofits exemplified in the decentralized housing network have blurred, creating a puzzle: in many ways, the welfare state is more present around us and harder to see.
Notes
• approximately 53 percent of the heads of households were white, 33 percent were black, 11 percent were Hispanic, and 3.5 percent were of other races (43) 9. This is the CDBG amount net of earmarked program set-asides (e.g., Youthbuild), but including the amounts variously described as the Secretary's Discretionary Fund or Special Purpose Grants, since data on these amounts are not included in a number of the early HUD Budget Summaries. Source: National Low Income Housing Coalition tabulations of annual HUD Budget Summary data. The amount allocated each year is based on a per capita allotment-1.25 per person. The amount is granted each year for ten years. The amount that is given to any particular project is usually the present value amount for the ten-year stream of credits and therefore is more like 70 percent of the total amount that is awarded. LIHTC-tabulated from material from the NCSHA. Budget authority: In the early years, many credits went unused and were rolled over to subsequent years, but all the credits were used in the year they were issued. Chicago, 1940 -1960 (Chicago, 1998 (New York, 2002) . To Katz, this development starkly contrasts British sociologist T. H. Marshall's classic 1950 characterization of the welfare state as "the subordination of market price to social justice." Katz writes, "While the tension between capitalism and equality remains as powerful as ever, today it is social justice that is subordinate to market price" (1) .
